重庆社会科学

寿险公司与代理人之间是一种松散的委托一代理关系,两者之间的目标存在差异。委托一代理理论、激励理论表明,代理人在利益的诱惑下,为了实现个人利益的最大化,而以损害寿险公司、客户的利益为代价。寿险公司应该在薪酬机制的设置上增加代理人的违规成本,约束其行为。我国对寿险代理人的报酬普遍实行的是无底薪的佣金制度,薪酬改革与设计的核心是将代理人对个人利益的追求转化为对公司利润最大化的追求。进一步改革和完善薪酬管理制度,可从薪酬构成、绩效考核制度和佣金支付模式等方面进行改革与设计,促使其在追求自身利益的同时,能够更好地实现寿险公司的利益和目标。

Life Insurance Companies and their agents has the incompact principal-agent relation,and the goals of them are different.The principal-agent theory and incentive theory shows that agents which is attracted by profits, will damage the profits of life Insurance Companies and customers in oder to realize their profit maximization. Therefore,life insurance,in order to restrict the behavior of agents,should increase agents' cost of violating in de- signing salary system.Currently,life insurance companies generally take commission system without base salary.The key of reforming current of salary system is to change life insurance agents' persuit of their indivual profit to the one of whole companies',and to make them to carry out companies's goals and profits ,could start from Reward Constitutes,performance evaluation system,and payment model of commission.