| 459 | 1 | 389 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
必需设施原则的适用需满足三个基本前提：数据引发垄断、平台数据垄断可沿用传统反垄断法框架加以规制以及可适用于数据领域，该原则对平台数据垄断的法律规制具有指引意义。基于此，平台必需数据强制开放义务的构造可从客体、主体和内容三个层面展开。在义务客体方面，必需数据应满足不可或缺和不可替代的实质要件，以及竞争封锁与创新阻塞等形式要件。在义务主体方面，承担开放义务的是掌握关键数据资源并具有市场支配地位的平台企业，而开放对象则是具备竞争相关性和必要性的其他市场参与者。在义务内容方面，强制开放的范围应依据数据类型和应用场景合理划定，并遵循公平、合理、无歧视的原则有序推进。同时，应设置合理的豁免情形，形成完整的义务框架，为促进数字经济的公平竞争提供制度支撑。
Abstract：The application of the essential facilities principle is subject to three fundamental premises:that data constitutes a source of monopoly power, platform data monopolies can be regulated within the traditional antitrust framework, and the theory is applicable to the data field. Accordingly,this theory can be introduced to regulate platform data monopolies. Based on this, the construction of mandatory data disclousure obligations for platforms can be developed across three dimensions: the object matter, obligated parties, and the content. Regarding the object matter of the obligation,essential data must satisfy substantive requirements of indispensability and irreplaceability, alongside formal requirements such as competitive foreclosure and innovation obstruction. Concerning obligated parties, the duty to open data rests with platform enterprises possessing critical data resources and market dominance, while the recipients of such opening are other market participants demonstrating competitive relevance and necessity. Concerning the content of the obligation, the scope of mandatory disclosure should be reasonably defined based on data types and application scenarios, and implemented in an orderly manner adhering to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination. Concurrently, reasonable exemptions should be established to form a comprehensive obligation framework, providing institutional support for fostering fair competition in the digital economy.
[1]AREEDA P.Essential Facilities:an Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles[J].Antitrust Law Journal,1989,58(3):841-853.
[2]RENDA A.Competition-regulation Interface in Telecommunications:What's Left of the Essential Facility Doctrine[J].Telecommunications Policy,2010(1-2):23-35.
[3]GERADIN D.Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC:What Can the EU Learn From the U.S.Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft,IMS,and Deutsche Telekom?[J].Common Market Law Review,2004(6):1519-1553.
[4]SIDAK J G,SPULBER D F.The Tragedy of the Telecommons:Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications act of 1996[J].Columbia Law Review,1997(4):1081-1161.
[5]LIPSKY A B,SIDAK J G.Essential Facilities[J].Stanford Law Review,1999(5):1187-1248.
[6]李爱君.数据权利属性与法律特征[J].东方法学，2018 (3):64-74.
[7]DUCH-BROWN N,MARTENS B,MUELLER-LANGER F.The economics of ownership,access and trade in Digital Data[J].JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy,2017:1-54.
[8]张佳慧.数字经济时代平台数据垄断法律规制困境及进路[J].市场周刊,2022 (9):157-160.
[9]马平川.平台数据垄断的法律规制[J].浙江社会科学，2025 (3):46-56,156.
[10]张世明.数字平台相关市场界定本质论[J].甘肃社会科学，2024 (5):125-139.
[11]VILJOEN S.A Relational Theory of Data Governance[J].Yale Law Journal,2021(2):573-654.
[12]王帅.作为必需设施的超级平台及其反垄断准入治理[J].北方法学，2021 (5):148-160.
[13]侯利阳.平台形态演变视域下垄断行为的异化与因应[J].法学研究，2024 (1):184-204.
[14]李兆阳.从数据垄断走向数据开放：数据成为必需设施的竞争法分析[J].重庆大学学报（社会科学版），2023 (6):190-204.
[15]申卫星,陆志鹏.数据产权论[M].北京:商务印书馆,2024:69.
[16]孙晋，马姗姗.反垄断视野下数据开放与隐私保护的冲突与协调[J].武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2024 (6):154-166.
[17]冯子轩.我国政务数据开放的风险及其法律规则[J].甘肃社会科学，2024 (2):118-127.
[18]王苑.目的限制原则的反思及其解释论构造---以《个人信息保护法》第6条第1款为中心[J].华东政法大学学报，2024(4):44-53.
[19]张文显.法哲学范畴研究[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社，2001:309.
[20]殷继国.大数据经营者滥用市场支配地位的法律规制[J].法商研究，2020 (4):73-87.
[21]JONES C I,TONETTI C.Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data[J].American Economic Review,2020 (9):2819-2858.
[22]LAMBRECHT A,TUCKER C E.Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition?[J/OL].Marketing Science,2017,36(3):331-346.
[23]CHIRITA A D.Data-driven Mergers Under EU Competition law[M]//AKSELI O,LINARELLI J.The future of commercial law:ways forward for harmonisation.Oxford:Hart Publishing,2019:147-183.
[24]ROMER P M.Endogenous Technological Change[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(5):71-102.
[25]TUCKER C.Digital Data,Pplatforms and the Usual[antitrust]suspects:network effects,switching costs,essential facility[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2019(4):683-694.
[26]陈兵，马贤茹.数字经济平台企业垄断认定完善理路[J].上海大学学报（社会科学版），2021 (3):1-19.
[27]王晓晔.论数字时代多边平台的相关市场界定[J].中外法学，2025 (4):886-904.
[28]VARIAN H.Artificial intelligence,economics,and industrial organization[M]//AGRAWAL A,GANS J,GOLDFARB A.The economics of artificial intelligence:an agenda.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2019:399-419.
[29]时建中，焦海涛.反垄断法学[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社，2024:17.
[30]CHAKRAVORTI S,ROSON R.Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets:The Case of Payment Networks[J].Review of Network Economics,2006(1):118-142.
[31]贺立龙，骆桢.互联网资本的特性、行为规律与发展策略[J].改革，2024 (11):84-99.
[32]程威.数字平台加重义务的理论阐释与规范形塑[J].学习与探索，2024 (2):62-72.
[33]袁波.必需数据反垄断法强制开放的理据与进路[J].东方法学，2023 (3):147-161.
[34]尹建国，周采擎.公共数据授权运营的困境与法治出路[J].海南大学学报（人文社会科学版），2025 (3):226-234.
[35]王晓晔.标准必要专利反垄断诉讼问题研究[J].中国法学，2015 (6):217-238.
[36]秦玉琦.必要设施原则在数据垄断规制中的适用性研究[J].中国市场监管研究，2021 (7):59-62.
[37]LUGARD P,ROACH L.The era of'big data'and EU/U.S.divergence for refusals to deal[J].Antitrust magazine,2017(2):58-64.
[38]孟雁北.数字经济时代反垄断法视野下必需设施理论之高度审慎适用[J].中国社会科学院大学学报，2024(11):41-57,160-161,165.
[39]陈怡.企业间强制数据共享：理论、挑战及实现路径[J].中国海商法研究，2024 (3):83-95.
(1)中华人民共和国商务部.中共中央国务院关于构建更加完善的要素市场化配置体制机制的意见[EB/OL].(2020-05-21)[2025-10-07]. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zgdwjjmywg/art/2020/art_d5bd01ae35ec4f158bedda3ebe737e77.html.
(2)求是网.（受权发布）中共中央国务院关于新时代加快完善社会主义市场经济体制的意见[EB/OL].(2020-05-18)[2025-10-07]. https://www.qstheory.cn/yaowen/2020-05/18/c_1126001559.htm.
(1)SURBLYTE G. Limiting the scope of article 82 EC:what can the EU learn from the US Supreme Court's judgment in trinko in the wake of microsoft, IMS health and magill?[R/OL].(2006-03-31)[2025-11-24].https://ssrn.com/abstract=894344.
(1)LAMBRECHT A, TUCKER C E. Can big data protect a firm from competition?[R/OL].(2015-12-18)[2025-12-24]. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705530.
(1)Regulation(EU)2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector(Digital Markets Act)[EB/OL].(2022-10-12)[2025-12-24].https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R1925.
(1)参见《中华人民共和国个人信息保护法》第四条：“个人信息是以电子或者其他方式记录的与已识别或者可识别的自然人有关的各种信息，不包括匿名化处理后的信息。”
(1)国家市场监督管理总局.关于对《互联网平台分类分级指南（征求意见稿）》《互联网平台落实主体责任指南（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的公告[EB/OL].(2021-10-29)[2025-10-08].https://www.sac.gov.cn/cms_files/filemanager/samr/www/samrnew/hd/zjdc/202110/t20211027_336137.html.
(1)近年来，对于公共数据的范畴，有学者提出“扩张说”，主张将企业“具有公共属性”的数据也纳入公共数据的范畴，笔者对此持保留态度。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19631/j.cnki.css.2025.012.004
中图分类号:D99;D912.29
引用信息:
[1]冯子轩,郑惠文.平台必需数据强制开放义务的理据与构造[J].重庆社会科学,2025,No.373(12):49-61.DOI:10.19631/j.cnki.css.2025.012.004.
基金信息:
司法部法治建设与法学理论研究部级一般项目“人工智能时代环境风险规制的行政程序再造”（19SFB2017）; 重庆市高等教育学会高等教育科学研究重点项目“‘双一流’背景下的‘人工智能+法律’复合专业培养新模式研究”（CQGJ19A07）; 重庆市研究生教育教学改革研究一般项目“‘人工智能+法学’学科群建设的实践与探索”（YJG203044）
2025-12-30
2025-12-30