重庆社会科学

数字技术背景下,农村金融服务中的支付、结算与理财得到了有效解决,但农户信贷供给难题的破解一直没有实质性进展。基于演化博弈视角,尝试分析金融管理部门和商业银行在推行网络农贷中的博弈行为特征,推演金融管理部门与地方性商业银行推行网络农贷的演变路径,得出监管部门和资管机构的演化稳定策略。进一步分析博弈模型参数变动对金融管理部门和地方性商业银行两个群体的演化稳定策略的影响。在此基础上,提出促进网络农贷开展的政策建议。

Under the background of digital technology, Rural financial services, such as, payment,settlement and wealth management,have been effectively solved. However, there have been no substantive advances in the supply of credit for rural households. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the characteristics of game behavior of the financial authorities and the local commercial banks in carrying out network farmer's microcredit, deduces the evolutionary path of the financial authorities and the local commercial banks in promoting network farmer's microcredit, and derives evolutionary stable strategy of the financial authorities and commercial banks. Further, the paper analyzes the influence of the change of game model parameters on the evolutionary stability strategy of the financial authorities and the local commercial banks, On this basis, the paper puts forward the policy Suggestions for the financial authorities and the local commercial banks in carrying out farmers' microcredit by using digital technology.