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当前阶段,中国政府实施了一系列减税降费政策,助推企业降低税收成本,推进企业高质量发展。基于白酒制造业2007年至2022年的企业数据,实证分析了白酒制造业的企业税负状况和行业税负状况。研究发现:白酒制造业企业主要分布在中西部地区,相对于中部地区,西部地区企业总体税负较高;减税降费背景下,白酒制造业行业总体税负和行业所得税税负未见明显变化,行业消费税税负呈上升趋势,行业增值税税负呈下降趋势;与其他酒类制造业相比,无论是总体税负,还是单个主体税种的税负,白酒制造业的行业税负均较高。研究结果对如何利用税收杠杆以推进白酒制造业高质量发展具有政策启示意义。
Abstract:At the current stage, the Chinese government has implemented a series of tax and fee reduction policies to help enterprises reduce tax costs and promote high-quality development of enterprises.Based on the enterprise data of liquor manufacturing industry from 2007 to 2022, this paper empirically analyzes the enterprise tax burden and industry tax burden of liquor manufacturing industry.The results show that the liquor manufacturing enterprises are mainly distributed in the central and western regions. Compared with the central regions, the overall tax burden of enterprises in the western region is higher.Under the background of tax and fee reduction, the overall tax burden of the liquor manufacturing industry and the industry income tax burden did not see significant changes, the industry consumption tax burden showed an upward trend, and the industry value-added tax burden showed a downward trend.Compared with other wine manufacturing industry, whether it is the overall tax burden or the tax burden of a single main tax, the industry tax burden of liquor manufacturing industry is higher.The research results have policy implications for how to use tax leverage to promote the high-quality development of liquor manufacturing industry.
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(1)现有文献典型的税负计算公式如下:企业总体税负=(支付的各项税费-收到的税收返还)/当期营业收入;所得税税负=公司现金支付的所得税/营业收入;增值税税负=[公司支付的各项税费-收到的税费返还-(所得税费用-递延所得税-△应交所得税)-(营业税金及附加-△应交的营业税金及附加)]/营业收入;实际所得税税率(TAX)是企业所得税与税前利润的比值。在测算微观企业税负成本时,分母通常采用营业收入、利润、增加值等三种形式。
(1)该比较结果是根据各企业2022年资产负债表数据中总资产金额进行判断而得,具体数据见各企业2022年公开发布的资产负债表。
基本信息:
DOI:10.19631/j.cnki.css.2024.003.007
中图分类号:F812.42;F426.82;F406.7
引用信息:
[1]郭祥,周笛.减税降费背景下企业税负研究——基于白酒制造业的实证分析[J].重庆社会科学,2024,No.352(03):82-94.DOI:10.19631/j.cnki.css.2024.003.007.
基金信息:
四川省社会科学重点研究基地中国酒史研究中心资助项目“双碳目标下绿色税制与白酒制造业绿色低碳发展”(ZGJS2022-08)
2024-03-29
2024-03-29